%0 Journal Article
%T A Verification Approach for Applied System Security
%A Brucker, Achim D.
%A Wolff, Burkhart
%J International Journal on Software Tools for Technology (STTT)
%D 2005
%V 7
%N 3
%I Springer-Verlag
%C Heidelberg
%@ 1433-2779
%G USenglish
%F brucker.ea:verification:2005
%X We present a method for the security analysis of realistic models over off-the-shelf systems and their configuration by formal, machine-checked proofs. The presentation follows a large case study based on a formal security analysis of a CVS-Server architecture. The analysis is based on an abstract architecture (enforcing a role-based access control), which is refined to an implementation architecture (based on the usual discretionary access control provided by the \posix environment). Both architectures serve as a skeleton to formulate access control and confidentiality properties. Both the abstract and the implementation architecture are specified in the language Z. Based on a logical embedding of Z into Isabelle/HOL, we provide formal, machine-checked proofs for consistency properties of the specification, for the correctness of the refinement, and for security properties.
%K verification, security, access control, refinement, POSIX, CVS, Z 
%U http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-verification-2005
%U http://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/download/2005/brucker.ea-verification-2005.pdf
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10009-004-0176-3
%P 233-247